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Abstract
Intimate partner violence is widespread and represents an obstacle to human freedom
and a significant public health concern. Poverty alleviation programs and efforts to eco-
nomically “empower” women have become popular policy options, but theory and empirical
evidence are mixed on the relationship between women’s empowerment and the experience
of violence. We study the effects of a successful poverty alleviation program on women’s
empowerment and intimate partner relations and violence from 2009 to 2011. In the first
experiment, a cluster-randomized superiority trial, 15 marginalized people (86% women)
were identified in each of 120 villages (n=1,800) in Gulu and Kitgum districts in Uganda.
Half of villages were randomly assigned via public lottery to immediate treatment: five days
of business training, $150, and supervision and advising. We examine intent-to-treat esti-
mates of program impact and heterogeneity in treatment effects by initial quality of partner
relations. 16 months after the initial grants, the program doubled business ownership and
incomes (p < 0.01); we show that the effect on monthly income, however, is moderated by
initial quality of intimate partner relations. We also find small increases in marital control
(p < 0.05), self-reported autonomy (p < 0.10), and quality of partner relations (p < 0.01),
but essentially no change in intimate partner violence. In a second experiment, we study
the impact of a low-cost attempt to include household partners (often husbands) in the pro-
cess. Women from the 60 waitlist villages (n=904) were randomly assigned to participate in
the program as individuals or with a household partner. We observe small, non-significant
decreases in abuse and marital control and large increases in the quality of relationships
(p < 0.05), but no effects on women’s attitudes toward gender norms and a non-significant
reduction in autonomy. Involving men and changing framing to promote more inclusive
programming can improve relationships, but may not change gender attitudes or increase
business success. Increasing women’s earnings has no effect on intimate partner violence.
Keywords: Uganda, poverty, gender, cash transfers, microenterprise, empowerment,
intimate partner violence, post-conflict
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Introduction
Intimate partner violence (IPV)—abusive or controlling behaviors toward in-2
timate partners (Dixon & Graham-Kevan, 2011)—is the most common type of
violence against women (Garcia-Moreno & Watts, 2011). A 10-country study4
showed 15 to 71 percent of women experience IPV over their lifetimes (Garcia-
Moreno et al., 2006). In conflict settings, reports of IPV exceed those of rape6
and sexual violence from men outside the home (Stark & Ager, 2011). Some
estimates of the economic cost of IPV suggest it is greater than that of civil8
war or homicides globally (Fearon & Hoeffler, 2014).
This paper investigates how a widely used economic intervention might10
also prevent IPV. Reducing IPV is an end it itself, since women’s agency and
empowerment, including freedom from coercion, is central to the pursuit of12
development as human freedom (Sen, 1999). IPV is also a public health con-
cern because of its association with poor physical and mental health, including14
depressive symptoms and suicide (Devries et al., 2011; Beydoun et al., 2012)
and HIV infection (Jewkes et al., 2010).16
One common approach is to address IPV directly through education or
discussion with men (Jewkes et al., 2014). Men’s attitudes justifying wife18
beating are a strong correlate of use of violence against women (Hindin et al.,
2008) which is seen as an expression of gender inequality and sustained by20
the normative use of violence Jewkes (2002); Jewkes et al. (2014). Many
interventions target groups of men and use training and discussion to change22
gender-inequitable attitudes and norms (Barker et al., 2010; Ellsberg et al.,
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2014).24
IPV is also addressed indirectly through poverty alleviation. Govern-
ments and development agencies commonly target poor women in low-income26
countries with cash transfers, livestock, and microfinance. These programs
are predicated on the idea that women’s earnings and enterprise will reduce28
poverty while advancing “empowerment”, commonly defined as improving the
ability of women to access health, education, earning opportunities, rights, and30
political participation (Duflo, 2011). Economic studies suggests that women
exercise more bargaining power in the household when their share of income32
rises (World Bank, 2011). As discussed below, there are theoretical reasons to
believe IPV could increase or decrease as a result.34
This paper investigates both approaches to reducing violence—poverty
alleviation and engagement with partners—in two experiments. First, we con-36
duct a randomized evaluation of a skills and cash-transfer program among ex-
tremely poor and marginalized young adults (mostly women), in post-conflict38
northern Uganda. In a second experiment, among the beneficiaries random-
ized to delayed treatment, we study the impact of modifying the program to40
involve male household members, typically partners.
Economic Empowerment, Poverty and IPV42
The theoretical literature has ambiguous predictions about the effects of in-
creasing women’s income and work outside the home on IPV (for reviews see44
Aizer, 2010; Hidrobo & Fernald, 2013). Some predict that increasing women’s
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income shares decreases violence. For instance, some sociologists and feminists46
see financial inequality between the sexes and women’s economic dependency
as root causes of IPV. Similarly, economic models of household bargaining48
commonly suggest that as a woman’s options outside of the marriage improve,
her tolerance for violence decreases, and the husband will strategically use less50
of it, lest he lose his wife and her income.
Others predict an increase in violence. Some sociologists argue that in-52
creases in women’s incomes increase tensions between partners, provoke emo-
tional backlashes, or lead men to use violence to reinstate authority. Some54
economists have also argued that, when a woman values a marriage intrinsi-
cally or where divorce is not a credible threat, men may use violence to capture56
the woman’s resources. Thus violence can increase with income or transfers
to women.58
Research on violence against women shows multiple risk factors across
the social ecology and suggests that interventions must address multiple risk60
factors at individual, family, and systemic levels over a significant period of
time in order to sustain change (Ellsberg et al., 2014; Jewkes et al., 2014).62
The empirical evidence about how best to increase women’s empowerment is
still thin and mixed (Vyas & Watts, 2009; Ellsberg et al., 2014), however,64
including whether economic interventions improve empowerment on their own
or whether supplemental interventions to address inequalities are needed.66
The first experimental evidence regarding economic empowerment and
IPV comes from a cluster-randomized trial of a group-based microfinance and68
Enterprise, Empowerment and IPV 6
gender and HIV training program for poor, rural women in South Africa
(Pronyk et al., 2006; Kim et al., 2009). A per protocol analysis suggests that70
the combined program reduced IPV by more than half and improved partner
relations; a secondary analysis shows that microfinance alone has little effect72
on norms or IPV (Kim et al., 2009). More recent studies of cash transfer pro-
grams in Mexico and Peru offer mixed results (Angelucci, 2008; Bobonis et al.,74
2013; Hidrobo & Fernald, 2013). Unconditional cash transfers in Kenya and
Ecuador show significant reductions in IPV (Haushofer & Shapiro, 2013).76
Engaging Men
The rationale for addressing IPV through men’s discussion groups is based78
on the belief that socially constructed gender norms about inequality are a
root cause of violence (Barker et al., 2010). Girls and boys learn gender roles80
and normative behavior, such as gender-based violence, by watching others
and observing rewards and punishments; this is the basis of social learning82
theory (Bandura, 1973), one of several theoretical etiologies of IPV (for a
review see Dixon & Graham-Kevan, 2011). Understanding and addressing the84
connection between violence and masculinity is also critical, gender theorists
argue (Jewkes et al., 2014). ‘Gender-transformative’ programs are therefore86
designed to change gender norms and to promote gender equality among men
and boys, most often by raising awareness and targeting attitudes throughout88
the social ecology.
Few interventions engaging men directly to reduce violence have been rig-90
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orously assessed (Ellsberg et al., 2014; Jewkes et al., 2014), especially outside
of high-income countries. One of the first studies of the men’s discussion group92
approach was a cluster-randomized trial in South Africa of Stepping Stones,
an eight-week participatory learning program on sexual health for both gen-94
ders. Men reported reductions in physical and sexual violence perpetration 24
months afterwards, but women did not report less victimization Jewkes et al.96
(2008). More recently in post-conflict Cote D’Ivoire, a randomized evaluation
of an IPV prevention program consisting of men’s discussion groups showed98
small but non-significant reductions in women’s reports of physical and/or
sexual IPV (Hossain et al., 2014).100
The economic program we evaluate, however, targets women, not men.
As we will describe, our program experience and previous qualitative work102
suggest that it is important to engage men in the process, but there was
not much evidence at the time to inform the program design. Interventions104
that have worked with men and women partners simultaneously have largely
been the domain of psychotherapy. In high-income countries, couples therapy106
is a well-established strategy for improving relationship quality and reducing
conflict (i.e. disputes) between partners (Snyder & Halford, 2012), the latter108
being a strong correlate of physical violence against women (Jewkes, 2002).
This is not the case in most low-income countries where psychotherapy is110
unavailable to the poor. Since our study commenced, a randomized trial of
a group savings program in Cote D’Ivoire that added a couples discussions112
group (EA$E) addressing household economic issues while implicitly touching
gender norms found a significant reduction of physical violence in the per114
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protocol analysis for women who attended more than 75 percent of sessions
(Gupta et al., 2013).116
Current Study
In 2009, an Italian non-governmental agency, the Association of Volunteers in118
International Service (AVSI), designed a cash transfer program called PRO-
GRAM NAME OMITTED to help ultrapoor women with little formal edu-120
cation to develop small businesses. AVSI aimed to increase women’s incomes
and autonomy. Asset transfer programs are one of the most commonplace aid122
programs for the extreme poor. In addition to providing cash, livestock, or
some other capital, such programs typically offer a bundle of services, includ-124
ing training, formation of self-help groups, and supervision. AVSI’s program
is unusual in that it offered cash instead of livestock and encouraged ultrapoor126
women to start nonfarm businesses like petty trading. This is an important
model to explore, if only because cash is much cheaper to deliver than livestock.128
As reported in Blattman et al. (2014), this microenterprise program led
to large, experimentally identified increases in employment and earnings—130
impacts that were at least as cost-effective as livestock-based programs. We
hypothesized, however, that these average impacts concealed substantial vari-132
ation. In particular, our qualitative work led us to hypothesize that poor inti-
mate partner relationships are an obstacle to developing successful small-scale134
businesses. And according to Saile et al. (2013), dysfunctional intimate partner
relationships are common in this setting. In a study of nine conflict-affected136
Enterprise, Empowerment and IPV 9
communities in 2010, more than 70 percent of women reported experiencing
at least one type of verbal, psychological, or physical abuse in the past year.138
These observations motivated a follow-up experiment that is the focus of the
current paper.140
In a second phase of implementation, clients either received the standard
program of business skills training and support described above or a variant142
called Women Plus (W+). In the standard program, now called Tii ki komi
in Luo or “Work by/for yourself improvement”, clients participated as indi-144
viduals. In the W+ variant, program clients were encouraged to participate in
the training and follow-up visits with someone from their household who helps146
to make financial decisions. For most women, this meant participating with
an intimate male partner/spouse or another important male figure, such as a148
father or brother. In both variants, the money went to the women. For W+
participants, however, the framing of the support shifted from a grant wholly150
controlled by the woman to a grant encouraging household input into decision-
making. The new framing is captured in the W+ program name presented to152
clients: Tic kacel ryemo can or “Let’s work together to reduce poverty”.
Thus in addition to testing the effects of the standard program on women’s154
autonomy and IPV, this study tests whether a low-cost variation—a slight re-
framing, basic training in couples’ communication and problem solving, and156
joint participation in the program—augments economic success while achiev-
ing the empowerment outcomes that were elusive in the first implementation.158
Based on our review of the literature and the results of our initial study,
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we theorized that this more inclusive approach would lead to a measurable160
impact in the partner’s direct and indirect support for the business—from re-
laxing constraints placed on the woman, to providing emotional support that162
helps the woman to juggle all of her responsibilities, to actively participating in
business operations. We further hypothesized that partner relations would be164
improved through reductions in tensions and IPV, resulting from the house-
hold’s increased economic security and the couple’s ability to communicate166
and work together. We also hypothesized that experimentation with new gen-
dered behavior patterns combined with business success and improvements in168
relationship quality would begin to change men’s and women’s attitudes about
gender roles.170
Methods
Setting and Context172
This study was conducted in northern Uganda between 2009 and 2011, fol-
lowing two decades of civil war between the Government of Uganda and the174
Lord’s Resistance Army. Security improved in 2005 as the rebel group fled
the country. When the study began in 2009, most of the 2 million people176
displaced because of the war had returned home from nearby displacement
camps. Although people exhibited psychological resilience, war and displace-178
ment left most impoverished and without the human and financial capital to
pursue non-agricultural income-generating activities (Annan et al., 2006).180
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Intervention
The PROGRAM NAME OMITTED (PROGRAM) program included four182
days of business skills training, a start-up grant of approximately $150 USD,
and follow-up support by trained field staff. The training taught participants—184
“clients”—how to create a business plan, budget, market goods and services,
and keep basic financial records. At the end of the training, clients prepared186
written business plans (with help from AVSI staff if illiterate). AVSI staff
disbursed cash in two installments and visited the clients approximately every188
six weeks for six months to monitor spending and provide advice.
In rural Uganda, like much of sub-Saharan Africa, men and women en-190
gage in a mix of crop sales, animal raising, casual labor, and small non-farm
self-employment, such as petty trading. Women commonly engage in all these192
activities. But animal-raising and non-farm businesses usually require some
starting capital, and the women in our sample were generally too poor to start194
them and had no source of credit. AVSI’s program was designed to overcome
these constraints.196
In a variant of the program calledWomen Plus (W+), clients were invited
to participate with household partners, thus changing the framing. The W+198
program also added one day to the training to cover additional material on (i)
cultural, gender, and financial barriers to female entrepreneurship), (ii) com-200
munication (a common component of couples therapy), and (iii) joint-problem
solving (see Online Appendix A; [INSERT LINK TO ONLINE FILE]).202
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Research Design
To estimate the impact on economic and social outcomes, we partnered with204
AVSI to conduct two cluster-randomized pragmatic superiority trials. AVSI
purposively selected 120 villages across six subcounties in Gulu and Kitgum206
districts—the districts most affected by war and displacement. In the first
study (Phase 1), we randomized half of the 120 villages to receive the program208
immediately or after a delay of approximately 20 months (1:1 allocation; see
Figure C.1 in the Online Appendix; [INSERT LINK TO ONLINE FILE]). Vil-210
lages were excluded from randomization if they had less than 80 households.
There were 1,800 participants across the two phases (n=896 in villages ran-212
domized to Phase 1 and n=904 in villages randomized to delayed treatment).
Figure 1 displays a CONSORT-style participant flow diagram.214
[Figure 1 about here.]
When it was time for the 60 delayed treatment villages to participate in216
the program (Phase 2), they were randomized to receive the standard program
(no group dynamics; n=439) or the W+ variant described above (n=465).218
In each delayed treatment village, individual clients were also randomized to
receive 0, 2, or 5 follow-up visits from AVSI staff (see Blattman et al. (2014)220
for a discussion of the cross-cutting designs and results). The Uganda National
Council for Science and Technology and Institutional Review Boards at Yale222
University and Columbia University approved the research protocol.
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Procedures224
In early 2009, AVSI held public meetings to introduce the program and asked
each community to nominate 20 of the most vulnerable people to take part.226
AVSI stipulated that three-fourths should be women aged 14 to 30. AVSI
screened 2,300 nominees and selected 1,800 (10 to 17 per village) to participate,228
screening out the least poor based on the results of interviews and home visits.
Thus there was no self-selection into the study.230
The author-led research team conducted baseline surveys with all en-
rolled participants between April and June 2009. Because illiteracy rates are232
high, Ugandan enumerators (who were not involved in program delivery) ad-
ministered surveys verbally and captured responses using handheld computers.234
They conducted surveys in private settings and obtained informed consent.
The author team trained enumerators on how to administer sensitive ques-236
tions about IPV and other private issues.
Villages were randomly assigned to immediate treatment or delayed treat-238
ment via a public lottery held in each district. Roughly 20 months later—16
months after clients in the immediate treatment group received their cash240
grants—all participants were surveyed again. Survey enumerators were not
blinded to treatment assignment due to the nature of some survey questions.242
Following this survey, the 60 villages in the delayed treatment group
were randomly assigned via computer algorithm to participate in the standard244
version of PROGRAM or the W+ variant (1:1 allocation). Individual clients
within each village (904 total) were also randomly assigned to follow-up. This246
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cohort of clients was surveyed a final time between June and August 2012,
approximately one year after receiving cash grants.248
Primary Outcome Measures
Our primary individual-level outcomes included IPV, attitudes toward gender250
norms, quality of relationship with partner, support from partner, and au-
tonomy and influence in household purchases (see Table 1). Measures were252
created by the research team or adapted from a subset of the 2006 Uganda
DHS (Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) & Macro International Inc, 2007).254
To measure attitudes toward gender norms, we asked clients to rate their agree-
ment with several statements about women’s rights and justifications for wife256
beating. We created a composite partner relationship score by standardizing
clients’ responses to seven questions about relationship quality, communica-258
tion patterns, listening skills, and dispute frequency. We constructed two
composite scores for partner support of household (e.g., help with chores)260
and business activities, and we combined these scores into an overall partner
support composite. Lastly, we constructed a composite autonomy/influence262
score from three questions representing a client’s autonomy and influence in
purchases (can decide how to spend money, can use earnings to buy clothes264
without permission, has a say in purchase of large household assets). Ad-
ditional details about the measurement of each outcome are provided in the266
Online Appendix B [INSERT LINK TO ONLINE FILE]. Items in tables and
figures marked with the † symbol refer to “partner who helps [client] make268
Enterprise, Empowerment and IPV 15
domestic and financial decisions” and may not refer specifically to the client’s
intimate partner.270
[Table 1 about here.]
We also measured the economic impact of the program by asking clients272
about three alternative measures of income (cash earnings, non-durable con-
sumption, and durable assets), their employment hours by activity, and their274
financial assets and access (savings, loans, and access to further credit). We
tracked use of the cash grant by looking at the overall pattern of all expendi-276
tures, as well as a self-reported measure of the proportion of the grant spent
across 12 different expense categories.278
Empirical Strategy
We estimate intent-to-treat (ITT) effects via the ordinary least squares (OLS)280
regression:
Yij = θTj +Xijβ + εij
where Y is an outcome for client i in village j, T is an indicator for282
random assignment to treatment (e.g. assignment to immediate or delayed
treatment, assignment to the standard PROGRAM or the W+ variant), X284
is a vector of controls including a district fixed effect, road distances between
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villages, and 90 baseline (i.e., before Phase 1) and midline (i.e., after Phase 1286
but before Phase 2) covariates (see Table C.1 in the Online Appendix). We
include distance measures to account for and estimate potential spillovers from288
clients in treatment villages to those in wait-list villages (see Blattman et al.
(2014) for more details about spillover effects in Phase 1). Robust standard290
errors are clustered by village.
AVSI and the authors designed the W+ intervention principally for292
women with partners. As a consequence, for Phase 2 analyses, we focus on
ITT results among two subsets of our sample: 1) all women and 2) women294
who reported having intimate male partners during the survey that took place
immediately before the Phase 2 program was implemented. The study was296
powered (80%) to detect a 0.27 standard deviation (or larger) increase in
quality of partner relations given 60 clusters of 15 participants each with a k298
of 0.03.
Finally, we expect the effect of treatment to be driven mainly by “compliers”—300
those who brought partners when assigned to W+. Assignment to W+ is un-
likely to affect outcomes through other channels. If so, we can also calculate302
a treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) estimate of the average treatment effect,
which uses random assignment to treatment as an instrument for the effect304
of actually bringing someone else (not necessarily an intimate male partner)
to the training on outcomes (Angrist & Pischke, 2008). This treatment effect306
can be interpreted as the impact of the program on compliers. To facilitate
comparison to previous empirical work on IPV and economic assistance pro-308
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grams (Pronyk et al., 2006; Gupta et al., 2013), we also report the results of
a per protocol (PP) analysis conducted among the subsample of women with310
intimate male partners. Women assigned to W+ were included in the analysis
if they attended at least two days of training with an intimate male partner312
specifically.
Results314
Study Sites and Participants
Table 2 reports baseline characteristics of study sites and participants. The316
average village population is 699, and most range from 350 to 1,000 people.
The average village is 45 kilometers from the district capital.318
[Table 2 about here.]
The average client in the sample was 27.3 years old and completed 2.8320
years of education. 85.9 percent of the sample was female, and 47.9 percent
were married and living with a partner. On average, clients reported working322
15.4 hours week in the past month, principally farming. On average, reported
cash earnings in the previous month were 8,938 UGX, roughly $4.47 USD. Ta-324
ble C.2 in the Online Appendix [INSERT LINK TO ONLINE FILE] compares
clients assigned to delayed treatment (thus the sample for the randomization326
to W+ in Phase 2) to villagers not enrolled in the program. All villagers were
poor, but clients reported slightly less education, employment and income.328
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Randomization Balance
There was moderate imbalance in Phase 1 baseline covariates between individ-330
uals assigned to immediate treatment (Phase 1) or delayed treatment (Phase
2), but little imbalance in the Phase 2 assignment to the standard program or332
W+. See Table 2 for the results of an OLS regression of baseline covariates
on indicators of assignment to treatment (Phase 1 versus Phase 2; standard334
program versus W+ in Phase 2). The results suggest that the immediate treat-
ment group was slightly worse off economically, which if true would lead to336
an underestimation of the treatment effects. In this paper, however, we focus
mainly on the results of the second randomization to the standard program338
or W+. We control for covariates in our estimates of all treatment effects to
account for any potential bias and to increase precision.340
Treatment Compliance
All 120 villages randomized to immediate or delayed treatment participated in342
the program in the allocated order, and no clusters were lost. At the individual
level, there were no crossovers from wait-list control to immediate treatment344
in Phase 1 or from the standard program (control) to W+ (treatment) in
Phase 2. Of the original 896 clients randomized to immediate treatment, 860346
participated in the program in Phase 1 (96.0%). Reasons for non-participation
included movement out of the subcounty, health issues, and other personal348
concerns.
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As shown in Figure 1, 904 clients in the wait-list control group were ran-350
domized to the standard PROGRAM (n=439) or W+ (n=465) prior to the
start of Phase 2. Clients assigned to W+ were encouraged to participate in352
the program with someone in the household who helped to make important
decisions, and 87.0% of women complied. Compliance for W+ is defined as354
receiving the grant, attending the training sessions, and having a partner (not
necessarily an intimate partner) who attended at least 2 days of the train-356
ing. The program had 100 percent attendance among the grant recipients, so
noncompliance in W+ is related to partners’ attendance.358
Survey Attrition
Survey attrition (loss-to-follow-up) was minimal in both phases. We completed360
surveys with all clients at the Phase 1 baseline and found 96 percent of clients—
including migrants—for the survey conducted at the end of Phase 1. We362
also found 96 percent of the Phase 2 sample at the conclusion of Phase 2.
Tables C.3 and C.4 in the Online Appendix [INSERT LINK TO ONLINE364
FILE] report complete survey response rates and demonstrate that attrition
is not generally significantly correlated with treatment or baseline covariates.366
Unfound participants were slightly younger and less educated, but more likely
to be attending school.368
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Phase 1 Treatment Effects
Selected Phase 1 treatment effects are displayed in Table 3 and Panel A of370
Figure 2. The ITT estimates represent the impact of the standard program
compared to the delayed treatment group. The point estimates in the plot are372
standardized and surrounded by 95 percent confidence intervals. Effects in the
hypothesized direction are shaded black.374
[Table 3 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]376
Economic outcomes As reported in Blattman et al. (2014), the program
had large economic impacts. Most of the women invested in petty trading378
and retailing, adding this to their existing farm activities. About a third
of the grant was invested in the first month in the new business, with the380
rest largely saved in cash or durable assets. As a result of these investments,
female clients doubled microenterprise ownership from 40 to 79 percent, in-382
creased non-agricultural employment hours by 94 percent (from 5.2 to 10.1)
and doubled their monthly earnings (from $7.15 to $15.25 USD). The program384
had roughly similar effects on the vulnerable men included in the sample.
Treatment heterogeneity in economic outcomes To the extent that386
poor intimate relationships constrain business success, we should observe neg-
ative average treatment effects (ATEs) on business development and survival388
among women who initially reported that their partners did not treat them
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well. Furthermore, if poor relationships limit women’s ability to focus on the390
business, we should observe a positive ATE on hours spent on domestic chores
and a negative ATE on monthly earnings.392
Table 4 reports estimates of treatment heterogeneity in economic out-
comes in the full program according to pre-treatment reports of poor partner394
relations and IPV. Results are mixed. There is little evidence of treatment
heterogeneity in terms of IPV, but we do see heterogeneity related to partner396
relations. The most notable finding is that clients who reported that their
partners do not treat them well earned $18.12 USD less in the month, essen-398
tially wiping out the treatment effect. However, they also reported increases
in durable assets and non-durable consumption, indicators of income expected400
to be lower among clients with worse partner relations. As anticipated, fewer
clients with poor partner relations were still operating businesses, though the402
effect was non-significant. But counter to our expectations, the average client
reported 5.8 more hours of chores per week.404
[Table 4 about here.]
Partner relations, IPV and attitudes about gender norms In addi-406
tion to the large economic gains overall, the program also led to small in-
creases in the average woman’s endorsement of more positive gender norms408
(non-significant) and in her own experience of autonomy and influence over
household purchases (p < 0.10). At the same time, however, the program also410
led to small increases in reports of marital control (0.14 standard deviations,
p < 0.05). The significant increase in the index of marital control is driven412
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in large part by the finding that women assigned to the treatment reported
having to give money to their partner more frequently and that their partners414
had taken money against their will.
Despite this pattern of partners attempting to capture women’s earnings,416
however, the average woman assigned to the treatment reported a significant
increase in the quality of the relationship with her partner of 0.18 standard418
deviations. The program effect on a self-reported index of physical, emotional,
and sexual abuse among women is essentially zero (0.02, non-significant; the420
prevalence of any abuse within the past 8 months among women assigned to
the control group was 19.7 percent).422
Phase 2 (W+) Treatment Effects
Table 5 and Panel B of Figure 2 show the impact of the W+ program on our424
primary outcomes in Phase 2. The comparison group for Phase 2 analyses
is the cohort of clients randomly assigned to participate in the standard pro-426
gram alone, so these effects are relative to an active control. We discuss each
family of outcomes below. Detailed results are presented in Tables C.5-C.8428
the Online Appendix [INSERT LINK TO ONLINE FILE]. In these tables,
ITT results among women are presented first, followed by ITT results among430
women who had intimate male partners before Phase 2 started. We focus on
these subgroups because they are the most relevant for an examination of the432
effect of the program on violence against women.
[Table 5 about here.]434
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Economic outcomes There was little impact of W+ on economic outcomes.
Involving household partners led to a 9 percentage point (pp) decrease in the436
proportion of women currently engaged in business and a 6 pp increase in the
proportion of women belonging to a savings group. A greater proportion of438
these women thought they could obtain a relatively large loan and business ad-
vice. The ITT effects among women with intimate partners are consistent with440
the ITT results among all women. Notably, the average woman who partici-
pated in W+ with a partner reported a decrease in non-durable consumption442
of 0.31 standard deviations.
Grant use and expenditures On average, women assigned to W+ did444
not spend their grant money differently than women assigned to the standard
program (see Table C.6 in the Online Appendix [INSERT LINK TO ONLINE446
FILE]).
Partner relations We see our largest, most significant results on outcomes448
describing the relationship between women and their partners. These results
are generally robust to different specifications, as shown in Table C.9 in the450
Online Appendix [INSERT LINK TO ONLINE FILE]. On average, women
assigned to W+ reported an overall increase in the quality of their relationship452
with partners of 0.23 standard deviations. This index captures a woman’s
ratings of relationship, the couple’s communication, and the partner’s listening454
skills—all targets of the brief W+ training. Women with intimate partners
reported spending hours per day more with their partner.456
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The average woman assigned to W+ also reported receiving more sup-
port from their partner, even for traditionally female chores. This increase in458
household support extended to partners helping with the business. Effects are
larger—sometimes more than twice as large—among the subset of women who460
reported having an intimate partner prior to the start of Phase 2.
IPV and attitudes about gender norms In contrast to the results of the462
full program showing a small increase in marital control and essentially no
effect on abuse, the W+ results provide weak evidence of a small decrease in464
both outcomes. The ITT results among women with intimate partners show
non-significant declines in IPV and marital control of 0.08 and 0.07 standard466
deviations, respectively. The only statistically significant ITT result is that
the average woman with an intimate partner reported a decrease of 0.11 stan-468
dard deviations in how often her partner tried to limit her contact with family
and friends. Comparable effects are found in treatment-on-the-treated anal-470
yses of women with intimate partners (displayed in Table C.10 in the Online
Appendix [INSERT LINK TO ONLINE FILE]). The per protocol analysis472
also produces similar results, although the decrease in marital control of 0.17
standard deviations is slightly larger and significant (p < 0.10).474
Women’s gender attitudes were essentially unchanged, except that the
average woman reported less endorsement of the idea that a wife can express476
her opinion when she disagrees with her partner (0.17 points on a scale of 0-3).
Women assigned to W+ reported less autonomy and influence over household478
purchases (decrease of 0.07 standard deviations).
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Discussion480
This study demonstrates that, in the context of an ultrapoor asset transfer
program in northern Uganda, the quality of women’s relationships with in-482
timate partners is an important determinant of economic success, but that
economic success does not affect intimate partner violence. Also, increasing484
male engagement does not lead to more economic success or less IPV, but can
improve the quality of couples’ relationships.486
First, we show that increasing women’s earnings has no effect on intimate
partner violence more than a year later. Economic success at microenterprise488
development may, however, subject them to increased efforts from intimate
partners to capture and control earnings. Theoretically, this has three alter-490
native interpretations. The lack of an effect on IPV could be interpreted to
mean that theories about male backlash (predicting an increase in violence)492
and women’s bargaining power (predicting a decrease in violence) have only
a weak connection to IPV (see Aizer, 2010; Hidrobo & Fernald, 2013). Al-494
ternatively, it could be that both theories are valid and both are operating in
this context, but the effects cancel one another out. It is also possible that496
much larger changes in income are required to see a change in IPV in either
direction.498
Note, however, that the clients doubled their income—an extraordinary
achievement for a program with cost-effectiveness at its core—but they are500
still poor in absolute terms. We cannot rule out the possibility that a larger
change in income would also have no effect on IPV, but it is difficult to imagine502
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programs more than doubling income in a cost-effective manner. Whatever
explanation dominates, we see no evidence that IPV ought to be a first order504
objective (or concern) for anti-poverty programs. That said, while economic
development on its own may be insufficient, it may be an important entry point506
and catalyst for broader, combined interventions that use economic gains to
stimulate wider social changes.508
Second, we show that a woman’s relationship with her partner is im-
portant determinant of economic success. Clients who initially report poor510
relations do worse economically than those with better relationships, and es-
sentially fare no better in terms of monthly earnings than women randomized512
to a control group waiting their turn to participate in the program. This
suggests that economic assistance programs should support clients who report514
poor partner relations, possibly through a low-cost modification like W+.
Engaging male partners appears to be a promising approach. We show516
that a slight, costless reframing of the program to a more inclusive household
approach involving partners (typically husbands) and an extra day of training518
on gender relations, communication, and joint problem-solving leads to large
positive effects on women’s relationships with their partner. It does not, how-520
ever, significantly improve economic outcomes or reduce IPV relative to the
standard individual-based program. One interpretation is that this effort to522
engage men and teach relationship skills created a sense of shared goals and
enabled couples to reduce frictions and misunderstandings over activities and524
decisions typically controlled by men in this setting.
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In terms of IPV-reduction, our results can be most closely compared526
to studies from South Africa and Cote D’Ivoire that show positive effects of
combining economic assistance programs for women with (i) ‘gender’ training528
and female discussion groups in South Africa (Pronyk et al., 2006) and (ii)
mixed-gendered discussion groups focused on household economic issues while530
implicitly addressing gender norms in Cote D’Ivoire (Gupta et al., 2013). Both
studies report 55 percent reductions in IPV in per protocol analyses (physical532
abuse only in Cote D’Ivoire; ITT results are small and non-significant). In the
current study, with a potentially more vulnerable conflict-affected population,534
we only observe a non-significant reduction in IPV (any physical or emotional
abuse in past 8 months) of 13 percent in a per protocol analysis.536
There are some key differences to consider, however. For instance, the
intervention we studied was a small dose by design compared to the others,538
and IPV reduction was not the primary intervention target. The South Africa
and Cote D’Ivoire trials involved regular meetings over roughly 15 months and540
5 months, respectively, compared to only one day focused on gender, commu-
nication skills, and joint problem solving in the current study. Additionally,542
it is unclear how much time post-intervention is sufficient to detect impacts.
Pronyk et al. (2006) waited 24 months, but Gupta et al. (2013)—like us—544
measured outcomes at 12 months post-intervention.
Taken together, the South Africa and Cote D’Ivoire studies suggest that546
pairing economic assistance and efforts to reduce IPV might be effective with
a large enough dose; however, given the small number of rigorous evaluations548
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and findings that are not robust to different specifications (i.e., ITT), further
intervention studies are needed to draw firmer conclusions. It is critical to550
continue to examine dosage to find interventions that are cost-effective and
have potential for scalability.552
In terms of couples’ relationships, we show that involving male part-
ners, even with a light touch, can promote positive changes and increase the554
partner’s support, even for traditionally-female chores. The sizes of the rela-
tionship effects are impressive given that they are comparable to effect sizes556
observed in studies of formal couples therapy (Snyder & Halford, 2012), a much
more expensive endeavor that has relied on professional therapists. Overall,558
we find partners are more supportive and less controlling when involved in the
process, but women lose a small degree of autonomy and fail to increase their560
endorsement of views that a wife should have the right to express her opinions,
the right to go about daily life without asking for her husband’s permission,562
and the right to freedom from abuse.
By having men participate in the initial training, watch role-plays, and564
practice communicating with their partners in front of the group, we aimed
to stimulate social learning that would lead to behavior change (Bandura,566
1973). We found modest evidence that this process began for the W+ couples.
Principles of operant conditioning (Skinner, 1953) suggest that, over time, men568
will be reinforced for supporting their wives as their behaviors are reinforced
by the wife and by the observation that their collective effort is benefitting570
the household. This process is hypothesized to create a situation of cognitive
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dissonance (Festinger, 1957) in which the male partner holds conflicting beliefs572
(e.g., women should not be allowed to travel freely outside of the village vs.
giving women freedom of movement helps them to be more productive business574
partners) and then seeks to resolve the dissonance by updating his beliefs.
That said, mutual obligation and a sense of men’s co-ownership can576
play out in complex ways, both decreasing women’s autonomy and improving
cooperative behavior. An alternative view of the results is that men have578
learned that a new and different way to influence their female partners is
by spending time with them, talking to them, and persuading them to do580
what they (the men) want. W+ has taught them how to communicate and
negotiate, so they step in and are heard more often, and also keep more control582
over things like business decision-making.
Limitations584
This study has two main limitations. First, we relied on self-report IPV data.
To the extent that clients were uncomfortable acknowledging abuse to our enu-586
merators, this would lead to an underreporting of IPV. It seems unlikely that
any underreporting would be correlated with assignment to treatment in either588
study, but we cannot rule this out. If women assigned to immediate treatment
in Study 1 or W+ in Study 2 were less likely to report actual abuse, it would590
attenuate average treatment effects. Second, we could not experimentally vary
the intervention “dose” given the cluster-randomized design and power limi-592
tations. Nevertheless, this study of a slight reframing represents an important
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first step.594
Finally, our results may not generalize to all models of economic assis-
tance (e.g., microfinance), but the intervention studied is similar to programs596
offered to millions of poor women around the world, thus making this an im-
portant contribution. It is possible, however, that the average woman in our598
sample—the poorest among a population of poor people affected by conflict—
would respond differently to the program than the typical woman targeted for600
economic assistance. Yet these results should still have broad applicability as
cash transfers continue to become more common as a humanitarian interven-602
tion in post-conflict settings.
Conclusions604
Conditional cash transfers, unconditional cash transfers, business skills train-
ing, and vocational training are increasingly common program and policy op-606
tions for improving the lives of the ultra poor—particularly poor women who
are thought to be more likely than men to invest earnings in family wellbeing.608
A parallel goal of most economic assistance programs targeting poor women is
empowerment, usually measured in terms of autonomy and bargaining power.610
Almost universally, studies show that these programs are effective at increas-
ing income, consumption, and wealth, but empowerment is more elusive. Our612
study is no exception.
Some theory and evidence suggests that increasing women’s incomes in-614
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creases their risk for IPV, others suggest this as a path to autonomy and
increased bargaining power, while others point to it as inadequate to change616
violent behavior on its own. We need to better understand the mechanisms
of change within households, in particular how economic factors and partner618
relationships influence each other. How and when to engage men in women’s
empowerment, particularly in cost-effective and scalable ways, remains under-620
studied.
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Figure 1: Participant flow diagram.
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Physical/emotional abuse in past 8 months
Perceptions of women's autonomy/rights
Self-reported autonomy/influence in purchases
Marital control in past 8 months
Partner relationship index
Index of income measures
Employment/occupational index
-1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Standardized Effect Size (dotted 95% CI)
Panel A: Impacts of full program (Phase 1)
Self-reported autonomy/influence in purchases
Employment/occupational index
Perceptions of women's autonomy/rights
Index of income measures
Marital control in past 8 months
Physical/emotional abuse in past 8 months
Partner relationship index
Partner support index, overall†
-1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Standardized Effect Size (dotted 95% CI)
Panel B: Impacts of ``W+'' partner inclusion (Phase 2)
Figure 2: PANEL A Impacts of full program (Phase 1). Impacts of “W+”
partner inclusion (Phase 2). These panels display the standardized results
of intention-to-treat (ITT) ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of each
outcome on an indicator of assignment to treatment among women (immediate
treatment in Panel A (Phase 1); W+ in panel B (Phase 2), a stratum fixed
effect, and baseline covariates. The point estimates were standardized by
dividing the coefficient on assignment by the control group standard deviation
(Glass’s ∆). Black dots represent point estimates in the hypothesized direction
(grey if not in the hypothesized direction). Dotted lines represent 95 percent
confidence intervals (based on robust standard errors clustered at the village
level). † Items refer to “partner who helps [client] make domestic and financial
decisions” and may not refer specifically to intimate partner.
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Table 1: Construction of gender, partner relations, and IPV outcomes
Outcome/Variable Scale (>) 2006 Uganda DHS
(1) (2)
Hours awake spent with partner in a typical day hours (+)
Partner relationship index z (+)
Relationship with partner 1-10 (+)
Freq of communication with partner about family† 0-3 (+)
Degree of communication with partner 1-10 (+)
Partner’s listening skills 1-10 (+)
Frequency of major disputes with partner 0-3 (+)
Partner treats well 0-3 (+)
Can express opinion when disagrees with partner 0-3 (+)
Partner support index, overall z (+)
Partner support index, family z (+)
Partner’s contribution to traditionally-female chores 0-7 (+)
Partner support index, business z (+)
Perceptions of women’s autonomy/rights z (+)
A wife can express opinions when disagrees with partner 0-3 (+)
A wife can transact in market without permission 0-3 (+)
A wife may buy clothing with own money without permission 0-3 (+)
A wife may insist on condom use if partner has disease 0-3 (+) 951
A wife may refuse sex partner has sex with other women 0-3 (+) 954
A husband may not beat wife for refusing him sex 0-3 (+) 828(d)
A husband may not beat wife for burning meal 0-3 (+) 828(e)
A husband may not beat wife for leaving without permission 0-3 (+) 828(a)
Self-reported autonomy/influence in purchases z (+)
Can decide how to spend small amounts of money 0-3 (+) 825
Can spend earned money without permission 0-3 (+) 820
Can have input on spending decisions on expensive goods 0-3 (+) 824
Physical/emotional abuse in past 8 months z (-)
Partner has recently threatened harm 0-3 (-) 1104(b)
Partner has recently humiliated in front of others 0-3 (-) 1104(a)
Partner has recently beaten 0-3 (-) 1105(g)
Partner has recently kicked or hit 0-3 (-) 1105(d)
Does not refuse if partner wants to have sex 0-3 (-) 956
Marital control in past 8 months z (-)
Partner has recently accused of being unfaithful 0-3 (-) 1103(b)
Partner has recently tried to limit contact 0-3 (-) 1103(d)
Partner has recently taken money against will 0-3 (-)
Cannot transact in market without partner’s permission 0-1 (-)
Partner has recently refused money for household needs 0-3 (-)
Has recently had to give money to partner 0-3 (-)
Physical abuse in past 8 months 0-1 (-)
Emotional abuse in past 8 months 0-1 (-)
Physical or emotional abuse in past 8 months 0-1 (-)
Note. This table details variable construction for gender, partner relations, and IPV outcomes. Column
1 lists the scale of each outcome. The character in parentheses indicates the valence of higher values:
good (+) or bad (-). Column 2 indicates whether the item was adapted from the 2006 Uganda Demo-
graphic and Health Survey. Numbers represent question numbers from the official DHS questionnaire.
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Table 2: Baseline descriptive statistics and tests of balance
Phase 1 (n=1,800; k=120) Phase 2 (n=904; k=60)
Control Treat Control Treat
M SD M SD p M SD M SD p
Select baseline covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Individual-level covariates
Age 27.61 7.28 27.04 7.19 0.20 28.30 7.34 28.09 7.65 0.73
Female 0.86 0.35 0.86 0.35 0.72 0.85 0.35 0.86 0.35 0.80
Married or living with partner 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.28 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.62
Highest grade reached at school 2.75 2.81 2.82 2.83 0.70 2.96 2.83 2.60 2.78 0.12
Reports having HIV or AIDS 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23 0.69 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.25 0.80
Reports positive hours in petty business 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.16 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.03 0.16 0.14
Weekly employment, hours 16.16 20.12 14.56 21.04 0.12 16.51 22.48 14.38 17.92 0.09
Weekly employment, hours: Farming for self 9.01 14.58 7.69 15.51 0.08 9.10 15.35 8.13 13.47 0.29
Weekly employment, hours: Farming for wage 4.33 9.99 3.57 7.48 0.08 4.41 11.71 3.99 7.85 0.51
Weekly employment, hours: Leje 1.62 3.66 1.65 4.18 0.91 1.55 3.76 1.43 3.28 0.65
Weekly employment, hours: Brew 0.48 1.62 0.54 1.48 0.45 0.55 1.90 0.38 1.26 0.21
Weekly employment, hours: Buy 0.35 3.17 0.43 4.60 0.67 0.41 3.57 0.27 2.72 0.55
Weekly employment, hours: Other 0.38 2.27 0.68 5.07 0.11 0.46 2.78 0.25 1.46 0.22
Weekly household chores, hours 33.98 21.02 34.93 24.75 0.53 31.86 20.41 31.81 23.63 0.98
No employment hours in past month 0.18 0.38 0.23 0.42 0.07 0.16 0.36 0.18 0.38 0.54
Durable assets (z-score) -0.61 0.47 -0.67 0.45 0.10 -0.59 0.47 -0.64 0.44 0.38
Monthly cash earnings (000s UGX) 9.33 13.29 8.54 13.07 0.26 10.06 14.81 7.74 11.24 0.02
Member of a savings group 0.11 0.31 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.12 0.33 0.10 0.30 0.43
Savings stock (000s UGX) 5.47 16.08 4.24 14.43 0.20 6.51 17.60 4.03 13.55 0.09
Total outstanding loans (000s UGX) 4.08 12.93 4.21 12.98 0.85 3.81 12.44 3.87 12.87 0.94
Can obtain 15,000 UGX loan 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.56 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.41 0.43
Can obtain 100,000 UGX ($50) loan 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.21 0.34 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18 0.88
Community maltreatment in past year 0.16 0.37 0.19 0.39 0.14 0.16 0.37 0.13 0.34 0.35
Related to a traditional chief or LC1 0.30 0.46 0.25 0.43 0.01 0.32 0.47 0.29 0.45 0.29
Total traumatic war events (z-score) 0.03 0.99 -0.04 0.99 0.21 0.05 1.03 0.05 0.94 1.00
Forcibly recruited into rebel group 0.25 0.43 0.20 0.40 0.03 0.25 0.44 0.25 0.43 0.92
Carried gun within rebel group 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.17 0.39 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.19 0.74
Forcibly married within rebel group 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.16 0.63 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.18 0.63
Village-level covariates
Village population 649.05 471.44 749.62 713.78 0.34 612.02 295.29 684.11 589.63 0.54
Distance to capital (km) 44.72 17.19 46.21 17.54 0.58 44.25 15.79 45.22 18.42 0.81
Accessible by bus 0.91 0.29 0.98 0.13 0.05 0.90 0.29 0.91 0.29 0.94
Village has a market 0.34 0.47 0.18 0.39 0.05 0.34 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.97
Number of shops in village 1.29 4.43 1.65 4.29 0.66 1.17 4.06 1.41 4.76 0.84
Total NGOs in village 7.42 4.26 7.12 3.55 0.68 7.34 3.23 7.50 5.04 0.89
Note. Individual-level covariates come from self-reported surveys. Village-level covariates come from a survey of a community leader
or leaders. All Ugandan shilling (UGX)-denominated variables and all hours worked variables were top-censored at the 99th percentile
to contain outliers. Missing observations at baseline were imputed at the median. Columns 1-4 and 6-9 report the mean and standard
deviation of all respondents prior to Phase 1 and Phase 2, respectively. Columns 5 and 10 report the p-values on balance resulting from OLS
regressions of each baseline characteristic on an indicator for treatment assignment plus a strata fixed effect, with heteroskedastic-robust
standard errors clustered at the village level.
Enterprise, Empowerment and IPV 42
Ta
bl
e
3:
Im
pa
ct
s
of
fu
ll
pr
og
ra
m
(P
ha
se
1)
:
Pr
im
ar
y
ou
tc
om
es
an
d
se
le
ct
ed
ec
on
om
ic
ou
tc
om
es
In
te
nt
-t
o-
tr
ea
t
es
tim
at
es
A
ll
m
en
an
d
wo
m
en
W
om
en
on
ly
C
on
tr
ol
(N
=
1,
73
4)
(N
=
1,
48
8)
Sc
al
e
(>
)
M
ea
n
SD
β
SE
95
%
C
I
β
SE
95
%
C
I
O
ut
co
m
e
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t/
oc
cu
pa
tio
na
li
nd
ex
z
(+
)
-0
.5
1
0.
98
1.
04
0.
05
**
*
(0
.9
4
to
1.
14
)
0.
98
0.
05
**
*
(0
.8
8
to
1.
09
)
St
ar
te
d
en
te
rp
ris
e
sin
ce
ba
se
lin
e
0-
1
(+
)
0.
50
0.
50
0.
49
0.
02
**
*
(0
.4
4
to
0.
53
)
0.
47
0.
03
**
*
(0
.4
2
to
0.
52
)
C
ur
re
nt
ly
do
in
g
bu
sin
es
s
0-
1
(+
)
0.
39
0.
49
0.
40
0.
03
**
*
(0
.3
5
to
0.
46
)
0.
39
0.
03
**
*
(0
.3
4
to
0.
45
)
Av
er
ag
e
wo
rk
ho
ur
s
pe
r
we
ek
:
N
on
-a
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l
ho
ur
s
(+
)
5.
34
9.
76
5.
88
0.
67
**
*
(4
.5
5
to
7.
21
)
4.
92
0.
72
**
*
(3
.4
9
to
6.
35
)
In
de
x
of
in
co
m
e
m
ea
su
re
s
z
(+
)
-0
.2
6
0.
87
0.
60
0.
06
**
*
(0
.4
8
to
0.
71
)
0.
55
0.
06
**
*
(0
.4
3
to
0.
66
)
M
on
th
ly
ca
sh
ea
rn
in
gs
00
0s
U
G
X
(+
)
15
.5
3
36
.8
0
16
.9
2
3.
12
**
*
(1
0.
74
to
23
.1
)
16
.2
1
3.
23
**
*
(9
.8
to
22
.6
1)
D
ur
ab
le
as
se
ts
z
(+
)
0.
07
0.
87
0.
41
0.
05
**
*
(0
.3
to
0.
51
)
0.
37
0.
05
**
*
(0
.2
6
to
0.
48
)
N
on
-d
ur
ab
le
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
z
(+
)
-0
.2
2
0.
88
0.
46
0.
06
**
*
(0
.3
5
to
0.
58
)
0.
41
0.
06
**
*
(0
.2
9
to
0.
54
)
Pe
rc
ep
tio
ns
of
wo
m
en
’s
au
to
no
m
y/
rig
ht
s
z
(+
)
-0
.0
2
1.
02
0.
07
0.
06
(-
0.
04
to
0.
18
)
0.
05
0.
06
(-
0.
07
to
0.
17
)
Se
lf-
re
po
rt
ed
au
to
no
m
y/
in
flu
en
ce
in
pu
rc
ha
se
s
z
(+
)
-0
.0
3
1.
02
0.
09
0.
05
*
(-
0.
01
to
0.
18
)
0.
09
0.
05
*
(-
0.
02
to
0.
19
)
Pa
rt
ne
r
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p
in
de
x
z
(+
)
-0
.0
4
1.
00
0.
19
0.
06
**
*
(0
.0
7
to
0.
32
)
0.
18
0.
07
**
*
(0
.0
5
to
0.
32
)
Ph
ys
ic
al
/e
m
ot
io
na
la
bu
se
in
pa
st
8
m
on
th
s
z
(-
)
0.
02
0.
06
(-
0.
1
to
0.
14
)
M
ar
ita
lc
on
tr
ol
in
pa
st
8
m
on
th
s
z
(-
)
0.
14
0.
07
**
(0
.0
1
to
0.
27
)
*
p<
0.
1,
**
p<
0.
05
,*
**
p<
0.
01
N
ot
e.
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
pr
es
en
ts
se
le
ct
ed
re
su
lts
fro
m
Ph
as
e
1.
C
ol
um
n
1
lis
ts
th
e
sc
al
e
of
ea
ch
ou
tc
om
e.
T
he
ch
ar
ac
te
r
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
in
di
ca
te
s
th
e
va
le
nc
e
of
hi
gh
er
va
lu
es
:g
oo
d
(+
)o
rb
ad
(-
).
C
ol
um
ns
2
an
d
3
re
po
rt
th
e
m
ea
ns
an
d
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
ns
,r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y,
fo
rt
he
wo
m
en
as
sig
ne
d
to
th
e
de
la
ye
d
tr
ea
tm
en
tc
on
di
tio
n
(c
on
tr
ol
).
C
ol
um
ns
4-
6
re
po
rt
th
e
re
su
lts
of
in
te
nt
io
n-
to
-t
re
at
(I
T
T
)
or
di
na
ry
le
as
t
sq
ua
re
s
(O
LS
)
re
gr
es
sio
ns
of
ea
ch
ou
tc
om
e
on
an
in
di
ca
to
r
of
as
sig
nm
en
t
to
im
m
ed
ia
te
tr
ea
tm
en
t.
C
ol
um
ns
4
an
d
5
re
po
rt
th
e
co
effi
ci
en
ts
an
d
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
fro
m
an
O
LS
re
gr
es
sio
n
of
ea
ch
ou
tc
om
e
on
an
in
di
ca
to
r
of
as
sig
nm
en
t
to
im
m
ed
ia
te
tr
ea
tm
en
t,
a
st
ra
tu
m
fix
ed
eff
ec
t,
an
d
ba
se
lin
e
co
va
ria
te
s.
C
ol
um
n
6
re
po
rt
s
95
pe
rc
en
t
co
nfi
de
nc
e
in
te
rv
al
s
ar
ou
nd
th
e
es
tim
at
es
in
C
ol
um
n
4.
C
ol
um
ns
7-
9
re
po
rt
th
e
re
su
lts
of
IT
T
O
LS
re
gr
es
sio
ns
of
ea
ch
ou
tc
om
e
on
an
in
di
ca
to
r
of
as
sig
nm
en
t
to
im
m
ed
ia
te
tr
ea
tm
en
t
am
on
g
wo
m
en
.
T
he
se
co
lu
m
ns
fo
llo
w
th
e
st
ru
ct
ur
e
of
C
ol
um
ns
4-
6.
A
ll
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
ro
bu
st
an
d
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
vi
lla
ge
le
ve
l.
Enterprise, Empowerment and IPV 43
Ta
bl
e
4:
H
et
er
og
en
ei
ty
of
fu
ll
pr
og
ra
m
(P
ha
se
1)
ec
on
om
ic
im
pa
ct
s
by
in
iti
al
pa
rt
ne
r
re
la
tio
ns
an
d
IP
V
A
ss
ig
ne
d
Ph
as
e
1
C
ov
ar
ia
te
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
Sc
al
e
(>
)
β
SE
β
SE
β
SE
95
%
C
I
O
ut
co
m
e
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
Ba
se
lin
e
co
va
ri
at
e:
IP
V
(n
=
71
5)
In
de
x
of
in
co
m
e
m
ea
su
re
s
z
(+
)
0.
48
0.
09
**
*
-0
.0
3
0.
04
0.
01
0.
05
(-
0.
08
to
0.
11
)
M
on
th
ly
ca
sh
ea
rn
in
gs
00
0s
U
G
X
(+
)
14
.6
6
5.
00
**
*
-0
.6
1
2.
11
0.
66
3.
11
(-
5.
5
to
6.
83
)
D
ur
ab
le
as
se
ts
z
(+
)
0.
27
0.
09
**
*
-0
.0
6
0.
03
**
0.
04
0.
04
(-
0.
04
to
0.
11
)
N
on
-d
ur
ab
le
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
z
(+
)
0.
43
0.
07
**
*
0.
02
0.
03
-0
.0
2
0.
04
(-
0.
11
to
0.
06
)
St
ar
te
d
en
te
rp
ris
e
sin
ce
ba
se
lin
e
0-
1
(+
)
0.
45
0.
03
**
*
0.
01
0.
03
0.
00
0.
03
(-
0.
06
to
0.
06
)
C
ur
re
nt
ly
do
in
g
bu
sin
es
s
0-
1
(+
)
0.
37
0.
04
**
*
-0
.0
0
0.
03
-0
.0
0
0.
03
(-
0.
07
to
0.
06
)
Av
er
ag
e
ho
ur
s
of
ch
or
es
pe
r
we
ek
ho
ur
s
(-
)
0.
05
1.
63
-0
.9
0
0.
69
1.
02
1.
27
(-
1.
5
to
3.
53
)
Ba
se
lin
e
co
va
ri
at
e:
Pa
rt
ne
r
do
es
no
tt
re
at
we
ll
(n
=
72
5)
In
de
x
of
in
co
m
e
m
ea
su
re
s
z
(+
)
0.
49
0.
10
**
*
-0
.1
7
0.
13
0.
03
0.
19
(-
0.
34
to
0.
41
)
M
on
th
ly
ca
sh
ea
rn
in
gs
00
0s
U
G
X
(+
)
18
.0
5
5.
48
**
*
2.
64
7.
50
-1
8.
12
9.
56
*
(-
37
.0
6
to
0.
81
)
D
ur
ab
le
as
se
ts
z
(+
)
0.
25
0.
10
**
*
-0
.3
5
0.
12
**
*
0.
17
0.
18
(-
0.
18
to
0.
52
)
N
on
-d
ur
ab
le
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
z
(+
)
0.
41
0.
07
**
*
0.
01
0.
11
0.
19
0.
17
(-
0.
15
to
0.
52
)
St
ar
te
d
en
te
rp
ris
e
sin
ce
ba
se
lin
e
0-
1
(+
)
0.
44
0.
03
**
*
-0
.1
0
0.
07
0.
10
0.
08
(-
0.
05
to
0.
25
)
C
ur
re
nt
ly
do
in
g
bu
sin
es
s
0-
1
(+
)
0.
39
0.
04
**
*
0.
01
0.
09
-0
.1
2
0.
11
(-
0.
34
to
0.
1)
Av
er
ag
e
ho
ur
s
of
ch
or
es
pe
r
we
ek
ho
ur
s
(-
)
-0
.4
9
1.
81
-5
.0
6
1.
94
**
5.
77
3.
09
*
(-
0.
35
to
11
.8
9)
*
p<
0.
1,
**
p<
0.
05
,*
**
p<
0.
01
N
ot
e.
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
an
d
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
co
m
e
fro
m
an
O
LS
re
gr
es
sio
n
of
ea
ch
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ria
bl
e
on
an
in
di
ca
to
r
as
sig
nm
en
t
to
im
m
ed
ia
te
tr
ea
tm
en
t,
a
co
va
ria
te
ta
ke
n
fro
m
ba
se
lin
e
(id
en
tifi
ed
in
th
e
pa
ne
lh
ea
di
ng
s)
,a
nd
an
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
be
tw
ee
n
th
es
e
tw
o
in
di
ca
to
rs
.
Ba
se
lin
e
co
va
ria
te
s
an
d
st
ra
ta
fix
ed
eff
ec
ts
we
re
in
cl
ud
ed
in
ea
ch
re
gr
es
sio
n
an
d
ar
e
om
itt
ed
.
C
ol
um
n
1
lis
ts
th
e
sc
al
e
of
ea
ch
ou
tc
om
e.
T
he
ch
ar
ac
te
r
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
in
di
ca
te
s
th
e
va
le
nc
e
of
hi
gh
er
va
lu
es
:g
oo
d
(+
)o
rb
ad
(-
).
C
ol
um
ns
2-
5
re
po
rt
co
effi
ci
en
ts
an
d
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
fo
rt
he
as
sig
nm
en
ta
nd
co
va
ria
te
in
di
ca
to
rs
,r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
C
ol
um
ns
6-
7
re
po
rt
th
e
co
effi
ci
en
ts
an
d
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
on
th
e
in
te
ra
ct
io
n.
T
hi
si
st
he
es
tim
at
e
of
tr
ea
tm
en
th
et
er
og
en
ei
ty
.C
ol
um
n
8
re
po
rt
s9
5
pe
rc
en
tc
on
fid
en
ce
in
te
rv
al
s
ar
ou
nd
th
e
es
tim
at
es
in
C
ol
um
n
6.
Enterprise, Empowerment and IPV 44
Ta
bl
e
5:
Im
pa
ct
s
of
“W
+
”
pa
rt
ne
r
in
cl
us
io
n
(P
ha
se
2)
:
Pr
im
ar
y
ou
tc
om
es
an
d
se
le
ct
ed
ec
on
om
ic
ou
tc
om
es
In
te
nt
-t
o-
tr
ea
t
es
tim
at
es
W
om
en
on
ly
W
om
en
w
/p
ar
tn
er
on
ly
C
on
tr
ol
(N
=
74
9)
(N
=
46
2)
Sc
al
e
(>
)
M
ea
n
SD
β
SE
95
%
C
I
β
SE
95
%
C
I
O
ut
co
m
e
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t/
oc
cu
pa
tio
na
li
nd
ex
z
(+
)
0.
10
1.
49
-0
.1
2
0.
13
(-
0.
38
to
0.
14
)
-0
.1
4
0.
20
(-
0.
53
to
0.
25
)
St
ar
te
d
en
te
rp
ris
e
sin
ce
ba
se
lin
e
0-
1
(+
)
0.
96
0.
21
0.
02
0.
02
(-
0.
01
to
0.
06
)
0.
03
0.
03
(-
0.
02
to
0.
08
)
C
ur
re
nt
ly
do
in
g
bu
sin
es
s
0-
1
(+
)
0.
71
0.
45
-0
.0
9
0.
05
*
(-
0.
19
to
0)
-0
.1
1
0.
07
*
(-
0.
25
to
0.
02
)
Av
er
ag
e
wo
rk
ho
ur
s
pe
r
we
ek
:
N
on
-a
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l
ho
ur
s
(+
)
7.
28
12
.9
9
-1
.0
1
0.
93
(-
2.
87
to
0.
84
)
-1
.2
3
1.
36
(-
3.
95
to
1.
48
)
In
de
x
of
in
co
m
e
m
ea
su
re
s
z
(+
)
-0
.0
2
1.
03
-0
.0
6
0.
08
(-
0.
22
to
0.
11
)
-0
.1
9
0.
10
*
(-
0.
4
to
0.
02
)
M
on
th
ly
ca
sh
ea
rn
in
gs
00
0s
U
G
X
(+
)
16
.8
9
31
.9
4
-3
.4
3
2.
49
(-
8.
42
to
1.
55
)
-3
.3
1
3.
09
(-
9.
49
to
2.
87
)
D
ur
ab
le
as
se
ts
z
(+
)
0.
76
1.
05
0.
07
0.
06
(-
0.
05
to
0.
19
)
0.
00
0.
09
(-
0.
17
to
0.
18
)
N
on
-d
ur
ab
le
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
z
(+
)
0.
06
1.
03
-0
.0
6
0.
10
(-
0.
26
to
0.
13
)
-0
.2
8
0.
10
**
*
(-
0.
48
to
-0
.0
8)
Pe
rc
ep
tio
ns
of
wo
m
en
’s
au
to
no
m
y/
rig
ht
s
z
(+
)
0.
05
0.
99
-0
.0
8
0.
09
(-
0.
25
to
0.
09
)
-0
.0
1
0.
11
(-
0.
22
to
0.
2)
Se
lf-
re
po
rt
ed
au
to
no
m
y/
in
flu
en
ce
in
pu
rc
ha
se
s
z
(+
)
0.
05
0.
98
-0
.1
1
0.
06
*
(-
0.
23
to
0.
02
)
-0
.0
7
0.
11
(-
0.
29
to
0.
15
)
Pa
rt
ne
r
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p
in
de
x
z
(+
)
-0
.2
3
1.
09
0.
23
0.
08
**
*
(0
.0
7
to
0.
39
)
0.
24
0.
11
**
(0
.0
2
to
0.
46
)
Pa
rt
ne
r
su
pp
or
t
in
de
x,
ov
er
al
l†
z
(+
)
-0
.1
7
0.
97
0.
21
0.
08
**
*
(0
.0
6
to
0.
36
)
0.
44
0.
09
**
*
(0
.2
6
to
0.
62
)
Pa
rt
ne
r
su
pp
or
t
in
de
x,
fa
m
ily
†
z
(+
)
-0
.1
8
0.
96
0.
23
0.
07
**
*
(0
.0
8
to
0.
38
)
0.
45
0.
11
**
*
(0
.2
3
to
0.
66
)
Pa
rt
ne
r
su
pp
or
t
in
de
x,
bu
sin
es
s†
z
(+
)
-0
.1
0
1.
02
0.
13
0.
09
(-
0.
06
to
0.
31
)
0.
28
0.
11
**
*
(0
.0
7
to
0.
5)
Ph
ys
ic
al
/e
m
ot
io
na
la
bu
se
in
pa
st
8
m
on
th
s
z
(-
)
0.
03
1.
17
0.
01
0.
08
(-
0.
14
to
0.
16
)
-0
.0
8
0.
06
(-
0.
2
to
0.
04
)
M
ar
ita
lc
on
tr
ol
in
pa
st
8
m
on
th
s
z
(-
)
-0
.0
1
1.
06
-0
.0
1
0.
09
(-
0.
19
to
0.
17
)
-0
.0
7
0.
10
(-
0.
26
to
0.
12
)
*
p<
0.
1,
**
p<
0.
05
,*
**
p<
0.
01
N
ot
e.
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
pr
es
en
ts
se
le
ct
ed
re
su
lts
fro
m
Ph
as
e
2.
C
ol
um
n
1
lis
ts
th
e
sc
al
e
of
ea
ch
ou
tc
om
e.
T
he
ch
ar
ac
te
r
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
in
di
ca
te
s
th
e
va
le
nc
e
of
hi
gh
er
va
lu
es
:
go
od
(+
)
or
ba
d
(-
).
C
ol
um
ns
2
an
d
3
re
po
rt
th
e
m
ea
ns
an
d
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
ns
,r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y,
fo
r
th
e
wo
m
en
as
sig
ne
d
to
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
e
in
th
e
pr
og
ra
m
al
on
e
(c
on
tr
ol
).
C
ol
um
ns
4-
6
re
po
rt
th
e
re
su
lts
of
in
te
nt
io
n-
to
-t
re
at
(I
T
T
)
or
di
na
ry
le
as
t
sq
ua
re
s
(O
LS
)
re
gr
es
sio
ns
of
ea
ch
ou
tc
om
e
on
an
in
di
ca
to
r
of
as
sig
nm
en
t
to
im
m
ed
ia
te
tr
ea
tm
en
t.
C
ol
um
ns
4
an
d
5
re
po
rt
th
e
co
effi
ci
en
ts
an
d
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
fro
m
an
O
LS
re
gr
es
sio
n
of
ea
ch
ou
tc
om
e
on
an
in
di
ca
to
r
of
as
sig
nm
en
t
to
im
m
ed
ia
te
tr
ea
tm
en
t,
a
st
ra
tu
m
fix
ed
eff
ec
t,
an
d
ba
se
lin
e
co
va
ria
te
s.
C
ol
um
n
6
re
po
rt
s
95
pe
rc
en
t
co
nfi
de
nc
e
in
te
rv
al
s
ar
ou
nd
th
e
es
tim
at
es
in
C
ol
um
n
4.
C
ol
um
ns
7-
9
re
po
rt
th
e
re
su
lts
of
IT
T
O
LS
re
gr
es
sio
ns
of
ea
ch
ou
tc
om
e
on
an
in
di
ca
to
r
of
as
sig
nm
en
t
to
im
m
ed
ia
te
tr
ea
tm
en
t
am
on
g
wo
m
en
.
T
he
se
co
lu
m
ns
fo
llo
w
th
e
st
ru
ct
ur
e
of
C
ol
um
ns
4-
6.
A
ll
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
ro
bu
st
an
d
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
vi
lla
ge
le
ve
l.
†I
te
m
s
re
fe
r
to
“p
ar
tn
er
w
ho
he
lp
s
[c
lie
nt
]m
ak
e
do
m
es
tic
an
d
fin
an
ci
al
de
ci
sio
ns
”
an
d
m
ay
no
t
re
fe
r
sp
ec
ifi
ca
lly
to
in
tim
at
e
pa
rt
ne
r.
Appendix A. Training programs: Aims and cur-
ricula
A copy of the training manual is available from AVSI USA on request (http:
//www.avsi-usa.org/).
Appendix A.1. Business skills training, standardWINGS
program
The stated objectives of the business skills training were to increase basic
knowledge and skills of business management, develop confidence in enterprise
initiation and management, and to help participants assess their own capa-
bilities and motivation in entrepreneurial career and strengthen and develop
business skills. The training was adapted from the CARE-Uganda Ecodev
projects training manual which is based on CARE Bangladesh’s Small Eco-
nomic Activity Development Sector and Rural Maintenance Program.
Training and subsequent follow-up visits were led by AVSI resident field
officers (RFOs), full time professional staff of the NGO. RFOs typically had
tertiary education in social work, the slight majority were men, and most had
at least a few years of experience on similar interventions. AVSI trained them
in providing business support as well as psychological and social support. They
were based in field offices at the sub-county level. Prior to administering the
training, each RFO had participated in a two-week course led by an exter-
i
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nal facilitator. RFOs were trained using the Participatory Rural Approach
Manual and the Community Resilience and Dialogue (CRD) Manual, aimed
for literate and non-literate persons, respectively. Training time was divided
equally between each training manual.
During this business skills training, participants were asked to address
five key questions: a) Can I operate this IGA? b) Will people buy my prod-
ucts? c) Is the IGA profitable? d) How much money do I need to start and
operate the IGA? e) Will the income from the IGA when added to other fam-
ily income, be enough to pay household incomes? These key questions were
practically presented to participants through lectures, small group discussion,
group games, storytelling, dramatizations and role-playing by participants,
large group sharing of experiences, and drawings. participants were also con-
stantly asked to recite the five key questions that they have to ask themselves
as they think about starting their businesses. After the training, participants
were given two weeks to develop a business plan, at which point AVSI staff
would return to review plans individually.
The curriculum outline was as follows:
• Business identification strategy and start-up process
– Business identification games
– Characteristics of an entrepreneur or good business person
– Steps to become a businessperson
– Business experience sharing
• Business management
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– Constraints on business growth and performance
– Advantages and disadvantages of being in business
– Importance of monitoring activities and progress, avoiding delays
and taking timely corrective actions
– Sales and sales promotion
– Choosing location and prices
• Whether to sell on cash or credit
– What are credit sales?
– Advantages and disadvantages of credit
• Financial management
– Separation of home and business finances
– Simple record keeping
– Simple income and expenditure tracking
– Costing of products and services
– Simple budgeting
• Developing a business plan
– Definition and purpose of a business plan
– How to prepare a simple business plan
• Basic management of a group savings and credit fund
– Reasons for saving
– Structure of a group savings system
– Reasons for a credit system
– Structure of a group credit system
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Appendix A.2. Business skills training, Women Plus (W+)
In this version of the program, facilitators taught the same business content
in addition to and introducing three new topics:
• Culture, gender, and finances (societal barriers to female entrepreneur-
ship)
– Discuss typical gender roles
– Consider how men and women can work together to achieve com-
mon goals
• Communication
– Identify good and bad communication patterns
– Learn and practice active listening skills
• Joint-problem solving
– Understand the importance of active problem solving with partners
– Learn and practice problem solving methods
Three core strategies ran throughout the training: (a) In-session mod-
eling/practice (social cognitive theory); (b) Open discussion of barriers and
cultural issues (motivational interviewing); and (c) Encouragement of reflec-
tion on personal experience and verification of concepts/lessons.
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Appendix B. Measurement of Primary Outcomes
Our primary endpoints included IPV, attitudes toward gender norms, quality
of relationship with partner, support from partner, and autonomy and influ-
ence in household purchases. Items marked with the † symbol refer to “partner
who helps [client] make domestic and financial decisions” and may not refer
specifically to the client’s intimate partner.
Intimate partner violence We asked female clients a subset of questions
about intimate partner violence from the 2006 Uganda DHS (Uganda Bureau
of Statistics (UBOS) & Macro International Inc, 2007). Our subset about
abuse included two questions about emotional abuse (partner threatened harm;
partner humiliated her in front of others), two questions about physical abuse
(partner recently beat or kicked/hit client), and one question about sexual
abuse (not able to refuse sex). See Table 1 in the main text for specific details.
Due to space limitations in the survey, it was not possible to administer the
entire domestic violence module. We analyzed 2006 Uganda DHS and found
that our subset of 2 emotional abuse items and 2 physical abuse items corre-
lated 0.87 with the full set of 12 emotional and physical violence items in the
DHS (0.86 when restricted to only cases from the north).
Clients indicated whether they experienced these behaviors “often” (3),
“sometimes”, “rarely”, or “never” (0) since a common reference point of the
Easter holiday (i.e., in the past 8 months). We standardized then summed
responses on these four variables to create a composite abuse score. Addition-
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ally, we created dichotomous indicators of experiencing any physical abuse, any
emotional abuse, or any physical and/or emotional abuse abuse. Responses
were coded 1 (any) if “often”, “sometimes”, or “rarely”.
Our selection of this reference point—since Easter—was a conscious de-
cision, since our priority was to maximize accuracy of our measures in the local
context and the internal validity of the experimental estimates, over compa-
rability to standard prevalence measures. In a prevalence study this would be
deeply problematic. In a program evaluation, which focuses on within-sample
comparisons, we felt it was the right choice.
For instance, as a result of pretesting, we did not believe that the 12
months approach minimized recall bias. Women in our sample have almost
zero education, and are more attuned to seasons and holidays than the Western
calendar. “In the last 12 months” is not a typical way of thinking about activity
in this context. Therefore, we opted to use a common reference point of “since
last Easter” to promote recall. In practice, this meant that we asked about
the past 8 months rather than the past 12 months. Since we are primarily
interested in the difference in IPV experiences between the treatment and
control groups at endline, the choice of 8 vs 12 month recall is arbitrary. It
would be problematic if we were more interested in studying the epidemiology
of IPV to compare the prevalence of IPV to other studies.
Clients used the same 4-point response scale to indicate how frequently
they experienced four marital control behaviors (partner accused client of be-
ing unfaithful, tried to limit her contact, taken money against her will, refused
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money for household needs) and reported whether or not they must get per-
mission from their partner to transact in the market. We standardized all five
marital control items and summed responses to create a composite marital
control score.
Attitudes toward gender norms We modified several “yes/no” questions
from the 2006 Uganda DHS (Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) & Macro
International Inc, 2007, p.420) regarding beliefs about whether a husband is
justified in beating his wife in certain scenarios and asked clients to rate their
agreement with several statements on a 4-point scale from “Strongly Disagree”
to “Strongly Agree”. We also asked clients to rate their agreement with five
statements about a wife’s autonomy to disagree with her husband, to purchase
goods without permission, to refuse sex, and to insist on condom use.
Partner relationship We created a composite partner relationship score by
standardizing clients’ responses to seven questions. Three items asked clients
to imagine a 10-step ladder and indicate on which step (1-10) they or their
partner stood in terms of relationship quality, communication patterns, and
listening skills. Clients also responded to four questions about relationship
quality, communication, and dispute frequency on a 4-point scale from “often”
(0), “sometimes”, “rarely”, or “never” (3).
Partner support We constructed two composite scores for partner support
of household and business activities, and we combined these scores into an
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overall partner support composite. Household support was measured by asking
clients to indicate “yes/no” whether their partner helped with 7 traditionally
female chores (e.g., washing clothes, cooking) and 2 traditionally male chores
(keeping the animals, hunting), in addition to providing an overall rating of
the partner’s helpfulness with chores since the program. Business support was
measured by asking clients to rate their partner’s support for the business—
“often” (3), “sometimes”, “rarely”, or “never” (0)—and involvement in the
business (1-10 ladder).
Autonomy/Influences in purchases We constructed a composite score
from three questions representing a client’s autonomy and influence in pur-
chases (can decide how to spend money, can use earnings to buy clothes with-
out permission, has a say in purchase of large household assets). Clients re-
sponded on a 4-point scale: “often” (3), “sometimes”, “rarely”, or “never”
(0).
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Appendix C. Supplemental Figures and Tables
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Figure C.1: Map of study villages. Thick and thin lines indicate district and
sub-county boundaries. Villages assigned to Phase 1 are represented by black
circles. Villages assigned to Phase 2 are hollow circles.
Enterprise, Empowerment and IPV xi
Table C.1: Pre-treatment covariates
Variable
Baseline:
Age
Female
Household size
Married or living with partner
Sole earner in HH
# of children
Non-Acholi
Currently in school
Highest grade reached at school
Literate
Speaks english
Month of training
Digit recall score
Reports positive hours in petty business
Hours worked:
Farming for self or caring for own animals (capped at p99)
Agricultural labor for others (capped at p99)
Casual labor (capped at p99)
Brewing (capped at p99)
Petty trading/business (capped at p99)
Other skilled and unskilled labor (capped at p99)
Average hours of chores per week (capped at p99)
No employment hours in past month
Durable assets (z-score)
Monthly cash earnings (000s UGX)
Montly gross cash earnings of other HH earner
Continued on next page
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Table C.1 – continued from previous page
Variable
Member of a savings group
Savings stock (000s UGX)
Total outstanding loans (000s UGX)
Can obtain 15,000 UGX loan
Can obtain 100,000 UGX ($50) loan
Family support index, z-score
Community participation, z-score
Friends/neigbors support index (z-score)
Number of groups in
Community maltreatment in past year
Domestic violence, z-score
Decision-making index, z-score
Attitudes towards women’s independence, z-score
Related to a traditional chief or LC1
Additive index of health (higher:better)
Reports having HIV or AIDS
Depression Index
Total traumatic war events (z-score)
Forcibly recruited into rebel group
Carried gun within rebel group
Forcibly married within rebel group
Bore a child in a forced marriage
Index of risk aversion (z-score)
Patience index (z-score)
Village Characteristics:
Village population
Mean Education
Experimental respondents per village
Remoteness: Index
Continued on next page
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Table C.1 – continued from previous page
Variable
Price level: Index
Cost of renting land (sq root)
Village was a camp
Total NGOs in village
Number of vendors
Number of kiosks
Number of shops in village
Number of tailors
Number of hotels/restaurants
Commodity market visits
Distance to capital (km)
Gulu dummy
Average inverse distance to simulated treatment villages
Inverse distance measure to treated villages within district and within radius of 4 km
Phase 1 endline:
Married or living with a partner
Reports positive hours in petty trading
Currently doing business
Started enterprise since baseline
Average employment hours per week: Agricultural
Average employment hours per week: Non-agricultural
Average hours of chores per week
No employment hours in past month
Main occupation is agricultural
Durable assets (z-score)
Monthly gross cash earnings
Non-durable consumption (z-score)
Member of a savings group
Savings (000s UGX)
Continued on next page
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Table C.1 – continued from previous page
Variable
Debts (000s UGX)
Perceived access to credit (z-score)
Community participation (z-score)
Friends/neigbors support index (z-score)
Decision-making index, z-score
Autonomy/influence in purchases (z-score)
Social support received (z-score)
Attitudes towards women’s independence, z-score
Number of groups in
Additive index of health (z-score)
Depression Index
Patience index (z-score)
Clients (N=917)
Non-clients 17-
40 (N=1,116)
Covariate Mean Mean
(1) (3)
Female 85% 56%
Age 28 30
Years of education 2.8 4.8
Average weekly work hours 15.0 24.7
Agricultural weekly hours 9.7 18.1
Working on your own farm 3.5 11.6
Agricultural labor for others 1.8 3.4
Taking care of own animals 4.3 3.1
Non-agricultural weekly hours 5.5 6.5
Brewing alcohol/beer 0.9 0.7
Petty trading 1.4 0.9
Casual non-agricultural labor 1.9 1.3
Skilled non-agricultural labor 0.5 2.5
Other 0.8 1.2
No employment in past month 8% 5%
Reports any hours in petty business 16% 17%
Monthly cash earnings, 000s UGX 15.8 13.8
Monthly household consumption, 000s 
UGX 108.4 141.1
Durable assets (z-score) -0.18 0.02
Thatch roof 0.00 0.01
Number of goats 0.97 1.29
Number of bicycles 0.39 0.63
Number of mobile phones 0.14 0.39
Notes: Individual-level covariates come from a self-reported survey of all respondents. 
All Ugandan shilling (UGX)-denominated variables and all hours worked variables 
were top-censored at the 99th percentile to contain outliers. Column 1 reports the mean 
of all 917 phase 1 endline respondents who were not treated in phase 1. Columns 2 
reports the mean for 1787 non-client respondents ages 17 to 40, and Column 3 reports 
the means for all 2420 adult non-client respondents.
Table C.2: Comparison of clients to non-clients within the village 
(Control villages only, at Phase 1 endline)
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Survey round Total sought
Final # of 
Obs. All Control Treatment Difference p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Phase 1
Baseline 5/09 1,800 1,800 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0%
Endline 12/10 1,800 1,734 96.3% 96.6% 96.1% -0.5% 0.62
Phase 2
Baseline 12/10 904 882 97.6% 97.8% 97.4% -0.4% 0.72
Endline (1 mo.) 9/11 904 858 94.9% 93.1% 95.9% 2.8% 0.13
Endline (1 yr.) 7/12 904 868 96.0% 95.0% 96.6% 1.6% 0.29
Median 
survey date 
(MM/YY)
Observations Response rates
     Notes: Column (1) reports the median survey date. Column (2) reports the full study sample sought in each phase. 
Column (3) reports the final number of observations by survey round. Columns (4)-(7) report the corresponding response 
rates overall, by treatment status, and the treatment-control difference (calculated via regression, controlling for baseline 
district). Column (8) reports p-value on the difference term, using robust standard errors clustered by village. There were 
1800 study subjects in Phase 1. Baseline data in Phase 2 includes the 847 original sample members from 2009, plus 2011 
data on the 57 new respondents who replaced those who died or left the village. 
Table C.3: Survey response rates
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Coeff. Std. Err.
Assigned to treatment at P1 0.0119 [.012]
Assigned to group dynamics -0.0170 [.013]
Assigned to 2 follow-ups -0.0220 [.015]
Assigned to 5 follow-ups 0.0107 [.015]
Phase 2 dummy 0.0179 [.013]
Gulu district -0.0264 [.008]***
Age -0.0028 [.001]***
Female -0.0187 [.014]
Married or living with partner -0.0132 [.008]
Highest grade reached at school -0.0032 [.001]***
Currently in school 0.0532 [.021]***
Average farm work hours per week -0.0001 [0000]
Average nonfarm work hours per week -0.0003 [0000]
Durable assets, z-score 0.0069 [.009]
Monthly cash earnings, 000s UGX -0.0002 [0000]
Activities of daily life, z-score -0.0062 [.005]
Symptoms of distress, z-score 0.0004 [.004]
Village population 0.0000 [0000]
Village remoteness, z-score -0.0025 [.004]
Observations 2704
R2 0.0283
P(baseline covariates are jointly insignificant) 0.0000
P(treatment assignments are jointly insignificant) 0.4457
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table C.4: Correlates of attrition
Dependent variable: Unfound
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Attrition bounds Attrition bounds
Dependent variable
Main 
Specification
Without baseline 
covariates
Replace missing 
with 90/10 
percentiles
Main 
specification 
from Table 4
Without 
baseline 
covariates
Difference-in-
differences 
estimate
Replace missing 
with 90/10 
percentiles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Started Enterprise Since Baseline 0.486 0.476 0.467 0.023 0.005 0.135 0.031
[.023]*** [.026]*** [.023]*** [.017] [.014] [.049]*** [.016]*
Currently doing business 0.405 0.405 0.350 -0.094 -0.095 -0.039 -0.089
[.026]*** [.028]*** [.026]*** [.048]* [.046]** [.055] [.052]*
Index of income measures (z-score) 0.596 0.507 0.508 -0.058 -0.072 -0.090 -0.029
[.06]*** [.073]*** [.059]*** [.082] [.105] [.093] [.084]
Monthly cash earnings, 000s UGX 16.919 15.709 15.043 -3.434 -4.962 -2.936 -1.777
[3.121]*** [3.167]*** [2.949]*** [2.493] [2.307]** [3.316] [2.289]
Durable assets, z-score 0.406 0.287 0.318 0.071 0.206 0.137 0.089
[.054]*** [.075]*** [.055]*** [.06] [.129] [.075]* [.067]
Non-durable consumption, z-score 0.464 0.437 0.388 -0.063 -0.158 -0.157 -0.060
[.059]*** [.062]*** [.057]*** [.097] [.1] [.107] [.097]
Perceptions of women's autonomy/rights 0.066 0.044 -0.025 -0.078 -0.143 -0.232 -0.076
[.056] [.063] [.056] [.086] [.108] [.093]** [.091]
Self-reported autonomy/influence in purchases 0.088 0.054 -0.011 -0.109 -0.171 -0.266 -0.118
[.048]* [.062] [.046] [.063]* [.085]** [.09]*** [.069]*
Partner relationship index 0.195 0.073 0.052 0.228 0.269 0.246 0.239
[.063]*** [.07] [.062] [.08]*** [.083]*** [.102]** [.092]**
Physical/emotional abuse in the past 8 months 0.025 0.099 -0.069 0.006 -0.024 0.116 -0.022
[.062] [.065] [.058] [.075] [.077] [.087] [.072]
Marital control in the past 8 month 0.141 0.207 0.036 -0.012 0.013 -0.001 -0.026
[.065]** [.069]*** [.063] [.091] [.096] [.132] [.091]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  Notes: Column 1 reports the coefficients and standard errors on an indicator for assignment to immediate treatment (Phase 1) from ordinary least squares regressions of each outcome on treatment, 
a Gulu district (strata) fixed effect, and the vector of baseline covariates reported in the online appendix. Column 2 replicates Column 1, removing the baseline covariates.  Column 3 replicates 
Column 1, but imputes missing values at the 90th percentile in the distribution for control individuals and at the 10th percentile in the distribution of treatment individuals. Column 4 reports the 
coefficients and standard errors on an indicator for assignment to W+ (Phase 2) from ordinary least squares regressions of each outcome on treatment, a Gulu district (strata) fixed effect, and the 
vector of baseline covariates reported in the online appendix. Column 5 replicates Column 4, removing the baseline covariates. Column 6 reports the difference in differences estimate for outcomes 
that were collected at the baseline survey.  Column 7 replicates Column 4, but imputes missing values at the 90th percentile in the distribution for control individuals and at the 10th percentile in the 
distribution of treatment individuals
Phase 1
Table C.9: Sensitivity
Phase 2
Program impact under alternative models
ITT estimate
W+  impact under alternative models (all women)
ITT estimate
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